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Abstract 
 
This study investigated lying behavior and the behavior of people who are deceived by using a 
deception game (Gneezy, 2005) in both anonymity and face-to-face treatments. Subjects consist of 
students and non-students (citizens) to investigate whether lying behavior is depended on 
socioeconomic backgrounds. To explore how liars feel about lying, we give senders a chance to 
confess their behaviors to their counter partner for the guilty aversion of lying. The following results 
are obtained: i) a frequency of lying behavior for students is significantly higher than that for 
non-students at a payoff in the anonymity treatment, but that is not significantly difference between 
the anonymity and face-to-face treatments; ii) lying behavior is not influenced by gender; iii) a 
frequency of confession is higher in the face-to-face treatment than in the anonymity treatment; and 
iv) the receivers who are deceived are more likely to believe a sender’s message to be true in the 
anonymity treatment. This study implies that the existence of the partner prompts liars to confess 
their behavior because they may feel remorse or guilt.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Fraud is practiced around the world, and the monetary losses are tremendous. For example, losses in 
the United States and Japan were approximately 560 and 307 million dollars in 2009, respectively.1 
Losses can never be totally eliminated, though they may increase or decrease due to policy 
implementation and efforts of the police. Why do people practice deception? Several studies on this 
question in order to help to prevent offenses before they happen as well as repeat them are 
investigated in experimental economics as well as social psychology.2  
For example, Boles et al. (2000) defined deception as the transmission of information and 
investigated the dynamics of deception and retribution in a repeated ultimatum game. They found 
that proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, though proposers told more 
outright lies. Brandts and Charness (2002) defined deception as an action different from the message 
one player sent about an intended play in a game. They also investigated willingness to punish an 
unfair action based on whether the action was preceded by a deceptive message. They found that 
false messages lead to punishment much more frequently than do accurate messages. Croson et al. 
(2003) defined deception as misrepresentation of the relative size of an outside option or the amount 
either player wrote in a sent message. They investigated the impact of cheap talk in an ultimatum 
bargaining setting with two-sided imperfect information. They found that lies about private 
information influences bargaining outcomes (offers and responses) in both the short- and long-term. 
In these studies, deception was considered a tool of negotiation in a bargaining game.  
On the other hand, Gneezy (2005) developed a deception game, which is a cheap talk 
game between a sender and a receiver and found that some senders told a lie when they could 
receive more of a payoff with three times the difference between stakes. His results could provide an 
insight into why people deceive as well as reasons for not telling a lie, such as feeling guilty about 
lying or having an aversion to lying (Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Lundquist et al., 
2009). Sutter (2009) tried to classify even telling the truth as deception if the sender chooses a true 
message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender’s message. He used the 
deception game and confirmed this definition of deception under team decision making, not 
individual type. Hurkens and Kartik (2009) reinterpreted the evidence on lying and deception 
presented in Gneezy’s results by adding strategy methods and different monetary payoffs in a 
within-subjects design. They confirmed Gneezy’s finding that there is a statistically significant level 
of lying aversion. With regard to how this aversion to lying varies with consequences, however, they 
could not show that the decision to lie was independent of how much a subject gained and how much 
                                                  
1 See the Crime Complaint Center for U.S. data at http://www.ic3.gov/media/2010/100312.aspx and the National 
Police Agency for data on Japan at http://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h21/index.html  
2 There are the several psychological studies on deception: An introduction to the psychology of deceit (Ford, 1995); 
Taxonomy of lies and their classifications according to content, motivation, and magnitude (DePaulo et al., 1996),; 
how to detect lies (Ekman, 1992; Vrij, 2001)., etc. 
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the partner lost as long as he/she preferred the outcome from lying. 
This study investigates lying behavior and the behavior of people who are deceived using a 
deception game with both anonymity and face-to-face treatments. Subjects consist of students and 
non-students to investigate robustness of lying behavior from the viewpoint of various 
socioeconomic backgrounds. Although the above mentioned studies focus on anonymous condition, 
only Holm and Kawagoe (forthcoming) investigated lying behavior in the face-to-face treatment by 
using a called bluffing game. However, in order to investigate whether the difference of anonymity 
affect lying behavior, we conduct the experimental deception game in the directly meeting 
face-to-face condition as well as anonymity. Apart from the deception game, the face-to-face 
condition has mainly two methods. One is that players meet directly, allowing decision making to be 
influenced by the counterpart’s appearance, such as face and physique (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 
1998; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Brosig et al., 2003; Bochet et al., 2006).3 The other is that subjects 
provide personal information such as name and gender, thereby possibly confounding results (Roth, 
1995; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Charness and Gneezy, 2008).  
Moreover, we explore how liars feel about their lying behavior. We give only senders a 
chance to send a message with respect to their behavior to their counter partners after the game. 
These messages were developed based on three kinds of liars’ emotions corresponding to lying 
behavior, i.e., fear of being caught, deception guilt, and duping delight in social psychology (Ekman 
and Friesen, 1969; Ekman, 1992).4 In this study, fear of being caught was indicated by not sending 
any message. Deception guilt was demonstrated by message i) I told a lie. I am sorry, and message 
ii) I told a lie because there were reasons. Duping delight was shown by message iii) I told the truth, 
and message iv) I told the truth. Please trust me. With respect to studies on the apology,5 they are 
reportedly used to rebuild damaged interactions (Ho, 2007; Abeler et al., 2010; Fischbacher and 
Utikal, 2010) and repair trust (Gibson et al., 1999; Bottom et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2004; Schweitzer 
et al., 2006), for example. 6  Compared with those studies, this study focused on voluntary 
confessions, which included the liars’ justification as well as an apology. We consider justification to 
be a kind of guilt that leads to liars revealing their behavior voluntarily.  
The following results are obtained: i) a frequency of lying behavior for students is 
                                                  
3 All researchers conducted a public goods game. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) found significantly less 
cooperation with e-mail communication than with face-to-face communication. Isaac and Walker (1988) found free 
form face-to-face communication especially effective in increasing contributions and efficiency. Brosig et al. (2003) 
found that level and stability of cooperation in pre-play face-to-face communication using visual and auditory 
information were higher than in nonverbal and either visual or auditory communications. Bochet et al. (2006) found 
that pre-play face-to-face treatment raised contributions relative to treatments that were not face-to-face.  
4 Ekman (1992) found that these emotions are felt by real criminals as well.  
5 In the economics literature, fear corresponds to the risk of consumption in an economic system (Turvey et al., 
2010) and to investment in assets (Hwang, 2006), for example. For a relevant study in the psychology literature, see 
Ekman et al. (1988). On the other hand, there are very few economic studies regarding duping delight (see Ekman, 
1989).  
6 See 2. Related Literature (pp. 3) in Fischbacher and Utikal (2010), which provides psychological studies on 
apology in detail.  
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significantly higher than that for non-students at a payoff in the anonymity treatment, but that is not 
significantly difference between the anonymity and face-to-face treatments; ii) lying behavior is not 
influenced by gender; iii) a frequency of confession is higher in the face-to-face treatment than in the 
anonymity treatment; and iv) the receivers who are deceived are more likely to believe a sender’s 
message to be true in the anonymity treatment.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the designs of the 
experiment. Section 3 presents empirical models and hypotheses. Section 4 presents results and 
Section 5 draws the conclusion. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedures  
 
2.1 Design 
 
We follow deception game developed by Gneezy (2005). There are two players; a sender and 
receiver. Only the sender is informed about the monetary payoffs of two different options, A and B, 
as follows:  
 
Option A: X yen to you and Y yen to the other student 
Option B: Y yen to you and X yen to the other student 
 
In Gneezy, X and Y consisted of several monetary payoffs. The sender’s only choice in this game 
was to send one of the following two messages to the receiver: 
 
Message A: “Option A will earn you more money than Option B.” 
Message B: “Option B will earn you more money than Option A.” 
 
The receiver reads the sent message and has to choose one of the two options implemented for 
payment. After his decision, the receiver is only informed about the monetary payoff from the 
chosen option. The receiver is not informed about the payoff for the other option or about the 
sender’s payoff in any of the options. Therefore, the receiver cannot judge whether the sender has 
told the truth either during or after the experiment. 
We conducted five treatments, as shown in Table 1. The anonymity treatment was divided 
into two groups based on students and nonstudents and by monetary payoffs.7 The procedure in this 
treatment is as above. In the face-to-face treatment, the participant group was students and the 
                                                  
7 The stakes were modified from the monetary payoff in Gneezy (2005) where {Sender: Receiver} = {$ 5: $6, 6$; 
$5} because the earnings in this experiment had to be higher than the minimum wage, based on labor laws in Japan. 
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monetary payoff was 1000 in order to test the treatment effect.8 In the face-to-face treatment, Roles 
A and B stood face to face at a table approximately one meter across in another room. In front of 
Role B in each pair, Role A chose one of two cards with one of two messages, inserted it into an 
envelope, and provided it to Role B directly.9  
 
------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
2.2 Procedures 
 
Our procedures were as follows:10 
 
Step 1: Participants were gathered in a room before the experiment. An experimenter read aloud 
a consent form in front of the participants. They were then divided into two rooms by 
lottery which determined Role A as the sender and Role B as the receiver. 
Step 2: The experimenters provided the experimental instruction sheets to participants in each 
room, and the participants read it.11  
Step 3: Role A chose one of two cards on which was written either message 1 or 2, inserted it 
into an envelope, and provided the envelope to the experimenters. The experimenters 
provided it to Role B in the pair. Next, Role B chose one of two cards on which was 
written either option A or B, inserted it into an envelope, and provided the envelope to 
the experimenters. 
Step 4: Roles A and B filled out the first questionnaire.  
Step 5: Role A was provided the envelope containing the option Role B had chosen. Then, Role 
A decided whether to send a second message. If Role A decided not to send a second 
message, Role A did not provide anything to the experimenters. Role B in the pair was 
not provided any message. On the other hand, if Role A decided to send a second 
message, Role A chose one of four cards with one of four messages, inserted it into an 
envelope, and provided the envelope to the experimenters. The experimenters provided it 
to Role B in the pair.  
                                                  
8 First, we conducted the anonymity treatment to investigate which treatment resulted in the highest percentage of 
lying. As a result, the highest percentage of lying behavior among abnormity treatments was the A1000-S treatment 
9 It took approximately fifty seconds per pair meeting for Role B to receive the message from Role A. No words 
were allowed between them during this step. 
10 The detailed instructions for the experiments are in Appendix A. All questionnaires and second messages used in 
the procedures are shown in Appendices B and C, respectively. 
11 For both senders and receivers, no instructions were written regarding second messages. 
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Step 6: Role A and the Role B who was sent the second message filled out the second 
questionnaire firstly and then the final questionnaire. Role B who was not sent any 
second message filled out the final questionnaire to participate in the same procedure as 
the others. 
Step 7: Participants received a show-up fee (500 JPY) and their earnings in cash privately. The 
earnings were based on the option Role B chose. 
 
 Until Step 3, our procedures are same as Gneezy (2005)12. After Step 4, it was extended to 
add the following two procedures: 1) the sender could send a message (hereafter referred to as the 
second message) about their lying behavior after the sender was provided the option which the 
receiver chose; and 2) all of the participants were asked to answer questionnaires on their behavior.  
During the procedures above, participants were asked to answer three kinds of 
questionnaires. As shown in Appendix B.1, the first questionnaire is, at Step 4, for Role A as the 
sender. There was one question regarding whether Role A expected Role B to believe that the 
message from Role A was true, as in Gneezy (2005) and Sutter (2009). As shown in Appendix B.2, 
on the other hand, in the first questionnaire for Role B as the receiver, there was one question related 
to whether Role B believed that the message from Role A was true, consistent with Gneezy (2005). 
In the face-to-face treatment, two questions were added regarding the extent of the acquaintance 
between partners and their impression of their partner.  
The second questionnaire is at Step 6. There were two questions regarding whether Role A 
sent a second message and the reason Role A sent it. On the other hand, there was one question for 
only Role B who sent the second message regarding whether Role B believed it to be true.  
The third questionnaire is at the end of Step 7. All participants answered questions related 
to socioeconomic characteristics.  
 
2.3 Second messages 
 
 The second messages were developed based on liars’ emotions, which are known in social 
psychology (Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Ekman, 1992). There were four different messages, as shown 
in Appendix C. The relation between the messages and liars’ emotions is as follows; The fear of 
being caught was shown by the decision not to send any message, meaning that liars did not want to 
reveal their lying behavior to their partners; Deception guilt was demonstrated by message i) I told a 
lie. I am sorry, and message ii) I told a lie because there were reasons, meaning that liars confessed 
their lying behavior (Kassin and Gudjonsson, 2004)13; and Duping delight was demonstrated by 
                                                  
12 Here we use envelopes as methods such that subjects are not able to see others’ decision making during 
transmitting. 
13 The setting for the confessions in this previous study involved a person admitting to having committed some 
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messages iii) I told the truth, and message iv) I told the truth. Please trust me, meaning that some 
liars will tell a lie repeatedly.  
Generally, cheap talk scripts used in games are conducted before the monetary payoff is 
decided because they affect each player’s behavior in the experiment. For example, Crawford (1998) 
conducted coordination games with cheap talk and found that it had a positive effect on cooperation. 
With respect to a bargaining game, some studies report that cheap talk has a positive effect for 
bargainers (Valley et al., 1998; Boles et al., 2000; Croson et al., 2003), whereas some studies do not 
report this effect (Forsythe et al., 1991). However, because the player who decided the monetary 
payoff in the deception game was the receiver and we wanted to research liars’ voluntary behavior, 
second messages as cheap talk were used after the game. 
 
3. Estimation model 
 
Here we use logit model regression in Model 1 of analyzing senders’ lying behavior and in Model 2 
of receivers who are practiced deception as follows: 
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i
Face
i
Face
j
n
Pooled
inn
m
immiiki
derPartnerGenpressionImAgreeable            
TreatmentSocionExpectatioPayoffLying
εηϕ
λφγβα
+++
++++= ∑∑
==
11
11
111
 
Model 2: 
j
Face
j
Face
j
Pooled
jn
n
n
m
jmmjj
derPartnerGenpressionImAgreeable          
TreatmentSocioBelieveDeception
εηϕ
λφγα
′+++
′+′++= ∑∑
==
22
11
22
 
 
where Lying is a dummy variable indicating lying behavior of individual i as a sender. Payoff is the 
monetary payoff k for individual i. Expectation is a dummy variable indicating an expectation of 
individual i that a receiver believes the message to be true. Socio is a variable indicating the 
socioeconomic characteristics k of individual i. Treatment is a dummy variable indicating each 
treatment l by individual i. This variable is used in Pooled data only. Agreeable Impression and 
Partner Gender are dummy variables indicating an agreeable impression of a receiver and partner’s 
gender for individual i, respectively. Both of them are used in F1000 treatment only. Deception is a 
dummy variable indicating individual j who is practiced deception. Believe is a dummy variable 
indicating individual j’s belief that a sender sends a true message. Parameters to be estimated are the 
                                                                                                                                                  
transgression, often acknowledging guilt for a crime. This study provided other settings in which confessions were 
presumed necessary for absolution, social acceptance, freedom, or physical and mental health, predictably resulting in 
personally damaging consequences to the confessor. 
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following: , , , , , , 1α 2α 1β 1γ 2γ nλ nλ′ , , mφ mφ′ , , ,  and . The terms  and 1ϕ 2ϕ 1η 2η iε jε ′  
are a random disturbance for individuals i and j (i ≠ j), respectively. 
 
4. Results and Discussion14 
 
We conducted the laboratory experiment at Osaka University. Participants were recruited from the 
Osaka University campus and from among neighborhood residents from a randomly selected sample 
of 30,000 households around the university.15 We conducted 47 sessions with 476 participants (116 
residents and 360 students)16 in January, February, and May, 2010. Each participant was only 
allowed to participate in one experimental session. The participants earned approximately 1500 JPY, 
on average. Each session lasted for approximately 35 to 60 minutes (minimum to maximum) and 
included between 4 and 18 persons. 
 
4.1. A sender’s behavior 
 
4.1.1. Lying behavior  
 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of lying behavior in each treatment. In particular, we found that the 
A1000-S treatment had the highest percentage of lying behavior among treatments, which is in line 
with results in Gneezy (2005) and Sutter (2009). In both Chi-square test and 2-sample test results for 
equality of proportions without continuity correction, we found that there were only significant 
differences between A1000-S and A1000-NS (Chi-square = 4.49, p = 0.034) at the 5% significance 
level.17 Therefore,  
 
Result 1: Lying behavior is influenced not by the existence of partners. 
 
This supports the economic theory that people who tell a lie to get more payoffs are rationally 
maximizing their utility, and this utility does not include partner information (e.g., face, build, 
gender). With respect to payoffs in the anonymity treatment, getting more payoffs induced lying 
behavior, which supports Gneezy (2005) and Sutter (2009).  
The percentage of lying behavior in the face-to-face treatment is in line with that in Holm 
                                                  
14 All data of senders and receivers in each treatment are shown in Appendix E. 
15 Residents were recruited through leaflets inserted in some popular Japanese newspapers (Mainichi, Asahi, Yomiuri, 
and Sankei). 
16 The socioeconomic characteristics in all treatments are shown in Appendix D. 
17 Other results are as follows: between A100-S and A100-NS (Chi-square = 0.008, p = 0.923), between A1000-S 
and A100-S (Chi-square = 2.371, p = 0.124), between A1000-NS and A100-NS (Chi-square = 0.279, p = 0.597), 
between A1000S and A100 (Chi-square = 3.581, p = 0.058) and between A1000S and F1000 (Chi-square = 1.621, p = 
0.203). 
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and Kawagoe (forthcoming).18  As compared with studies in which the face-to-face condition 
indicated a difference from anonymity related to allocated pie in a dictator game (Radner and 
Schotter, 1989; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Charness and Gneezy, 2008),19 this study showed that some 
rational behavior includes wrong ethical behavior like deception as well as equilibrium behavior as 
assumed by economic theory. That is, maximizing utility may not always involve ethical behavior.  
 
------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Table 2 shows the gender difference in liars between treatments. There was no significant 
difference between treatment and gender based on Fisher’s exact test for count data. 
 
Result 2: Lying behavior is not influenced by gender. 
 
With respect to gender differences, Dreber and Johannesson (2008) showed that males are 
significantly more likely than females to lie in a deception game, which a monetary payoff was used 
{Sender: Receiver} = {Option A; SEK 40:SEK 50, Option B; 50:40}. In our results, a gender 
difference was not different between treatments. This is in line with a psychological study (Tyler et 
al., 2006) which found that there are insignificant gender differences. Our results imply that males 
and females are likely to behave similarly (Eagly, 1987). However, since gender differences depend 
on culture (Gneezy et al., 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) and hormones (Chen et al., 2005; 
Kosfeld et al., 2005; Van den Bergh and Dewitte, 2006), they should be researched further.  
 
------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
4.1.2. The second messages of liars 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of second messages from liars in each treatment.20 Among treatments, 
                                                  
18 The results in Holm and Kawagoe (forthcoming) showed that the average percentage of lying behavior in the 
face-to-face condition was approximately 40 percent and 35 percent in Japan and Sweden, respectively. 
19 There are several studies that have compared anonymity and face-to-face conditions indirectly. For example, 
bargaining failures in Nydegger and Owen (1975), who conducted a face-to-face experiment, were far less than in a 
similar anonymous bargaining experiment (Roth and Malouf, 1982). Similarly, the face-to-face bargaining in 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) was less than the anonymous bargaining in Binmore et al. (1989). 
20 We excluded some data in each second message which was not written in the second questionnaire as follows: “No 
message” was based on the following reasoning: 1) I do not need to send a second message and 2) I do not apologize 
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there was a significant difference between A1000-S and F1000 only (Fisher’s exact test, p = 
0.037).21 Although a statistical test does not make clear which emotions liars feel, the number of 
Messages i) and ii) admitting guilt in the face-to-face treatment was larger than in the anonymity 
treatment.  
 
Result 3: Liars’ feelings about lying are influenced by the existence of partners, implying that this 
prompts liars to confess their lying behavior because they may feel remorse or guilt. 
 
Because this was a one-shot deception game and almost all pairs were strangers in the face-to-face 
treatment,22 liars did not need to maintain the relationship in the future. However, some liars 
confessed their lying behavior. Why did they confess? Generally, confession often happens when 
suspects are interviewed at a police station in an effort to lessen their criminal punishment 
(Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991).23 In this study, there was no punishment. Confession in this 
study may have meant that liars wanted to avoid feeling guilty about lying afterward. This differs 
from decision makers avoiding lying because they feel guilt beforehand (Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2006). In addition, liars may want to ask forgiveness because of concern for their mental health 
(Kassin and Gudjonsson, 2004). Determining whether this line of thought is valid requires further 
research. 
 
------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
4.1.3. Robustness by logit regression results on lying  
 
Table 2 shows logit regression results in Model 1 in Pooled,24 A1000-S, A100,25 and F1000, in 
which the dependent variable was whether senders told a lie. 
Only the variable Payoff was estimated to have significantly positive signs in all, which 
implies that people get more payoffs by telling a lie. This is in line with results in Gneezy (2005) and 
                                                                                                                                                  
for lying; I did not lie repeatedly. Second Messages i) and ii) were based on the following reasons: 1) to apologize for 
lying and 2) to excuse lying. Second Messages iii) and iv) were based on the following reasons:1) to make receivers 
believe the message to be true, and 2) to lie to cover up another lie.  
21 Other statistical results among the second messages were as follows: A1000-S (p = 1.000), A1000-NS (p = 1.000), 
A100-S (p = 1.000), A100-NS (p = 0.200), F1000 (p = 1.000), between A1000-S and A1000-NS (p = 0.200) and 
between A100-S and A100-NS (p = 0.400). 
22 Approximately 88% of pairs in the face-to-face condition were strangers to each other. 
23 Gudjonsson and Petursson (1991) indicated that there are three primary factors associated with criminals making 
confessions during interrogation based on a study of 74 criminals serving prison sentences in Iceland. 
24 Pooled data were excluded data in A1000-NS because of statistical results. 
25 A100 was pooled data in both A100-S and A100-NS because of statistical results between treatments. 
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Sutter (2009). The other variables were not estimated to be significant. That is, the variables Gender, 
Student and Partner’s Gender were insignificant, which supports the statistical results on gender and 
student. As compared with A1000-S as baseline, the variables A100 and F1000 were insignificant, 
which supports both statistical results. In F1000, the variables Expectation and Agreeable Impression 
were also insignificant. This implies that having a partner does not influence liars even though they 
have met them directly.26 These results show the robustness of Results 1, 2, and 3. 
 
------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
4.2. A receiver’s behavior27 
 
We analyzed which factors influenced the behavior of the receivers who acted based on deception, 
meaning that they were told a lie from the sender in the pair and then followed their message. 
Regarding a treatment effect, Table 3 shows logit regression results in A1000-S and F1000.  
The variable Believe was estimated to have a significantly positive sign in A1000-S, which 
implies that the receivers who were deceived overestimated not being lied to by a stranger. The 
variable Agreeable Impression was estimated to have a significantly negative sign in F1000, which 
implies that receivers who were deceived did not have an agreeable impression of the other person in 
the pair. With respect to socioeconomic characteristics, the variables Gender and Partner Gender 
were not estimated to be significant. This implies that gender was not an influence. Therefore, 
 
Result 4: The receivers who were deceived believed their partners to be trustworthy in the anonymity 
treatment. They did not have an agreeable impression of liars in the face-to-face condition. 
 
The first result infers that people overestimate the chances of not being deceived by a stranger. 
Interestingly, why did some receivers trust their partners in the anonymity treatment? One 
explanation is that trusting partners may be related to risk (Snijders and Keren, 1998; Ben-Ner and 
Putterman, 2001; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Eckel and Wilson, 2004)28 in the sense that one 
does not deceive someone unknown.29 However, we cannot examine the relationship between risk 
                                                  
26 Total percentage of an acquaintance or friend was 8 % (3/37) in the face-to-face treatment. 
27 Approximately 76% of the receivers followed the sender’s message, consistent with results in Gneezy (2005) and 
Sutter (2009). 
28 Ashraf et al. (2003) showed that trust is not related to risk. However, because Eckel and Wilson (2004) found both 
results, a relationship between risk and trust may depend on the risk preference measured (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 
2004). 
29 Some receivers indicated this in the questionnaire. 
 11
and trust in a deception game because risk preference was not measured in this study. In the future, 
this line of thought can provide a new implication on trusting others and deception. 
 
------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study investigated lying behavior of people who practiced deception, using a deception game 
under several conditions. In addition, we examined how liars feel about their lying behavior by using 
new messages from the sender to the receiver after the game. The results imply that the existence of 
partners for liars prompts them to confess lying because they may feel remorse or guilt. Furthermore, 
people who are deceived overestimate the chances of not being deceived by a stranger. 
The results for lying behavior are in line with previous studies, which support rational 
behavior as which the economic theory assumes agent. Our results including previous studies 
showed that lying behavior was a kind of rational one due to economic theory and that the rational 
behavior involves ethically wrong behavior such as deception as well as equilibrium behavior. For 
example as other ethically wrong behavior, Falk and Fischbacher (2002) investigated the relation 
between criminal activity (i.e., stealing money) and social interaction in an anonymity condition and 
found that subjects steal the more, the more others steal, on average.  
Second messages reflecting liars’ feelings were different between the anonymity and 
face-to-face treatments. However, we did not determine which emotion liars felt most often about 
lying. Because behavior and emotion differed between treatments, this may indicate a change in 
consciousness. If liars’ emotions were rational, as is lying behavior, liars would not have sent a 
message in both the anonymity and face-to-face treatments. Moreover, liars and their partners did 
not need to have a relationship during and after the experiment because the deception game was a 
one-shot study. Therefore, it is possible that this result provides a different definition of guilty 
aversion, meaning that liars avoid feeling guilty after lying because some may start to feel remorse 
or guilt because of the existence of partners. Moreover, the reason is possible that liars may want to 
ask forgiveness because of concern for their mental health (Kassin and Gudjonsson, 2004).   
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Appendix: 
 
Appendix A: Instructions (original text in Japanese) [with changes for face-to-face treatment] 
 
A.1. Instructions for Role A as a sender  
 
There are instructions and two kinds of messages, A and B, in the “Message 1” envelope. First, 
please check the envelope for these. Next, we will explain the procedure in depth. 
 
Overview 
In the experiment, one person in this room and one person in another room will interact with each 
other. Both of them are randomly assigned to one of two possible roles: either Role A or Role B. 
First, Role A will send a message to Role B. Next, Role B will choose a monetary payment option 
after Role B has received the message from Role A. The monetary payments for both Roles A and B 
in the experiment depend on the choice of Role B. 
Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk or in any way try to communicate with 
other participants during the experiment. The earnings are calculated by summing the monetary 
payment in the experiment and the show-up fee (500 JPY). You will be paid privately and in cash at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
Your role 
Your role in this experiment is Role A. Role B, with whom you will be paired in the experiment, is in 
another room. You will send either Message 1 or 2 to Role B. [Eliminating the following sentence: 
No information about your partner will be provided to you during or after the experiment.] At the 
end of the experiment, you will not meet Role B.  
 
Alternatives 
Two possible monetary payments are available to Role A and Role B in the experiment. The two 
payment options are as follows: 
 
In Treatment A1000-S, A1000-NS and F1000: 
Option A: 500 JPY to Role A and 1500 JPY to Role B 
Option B: 1500 JPY to Role A and 500 JPY to Role B 
 
In Treatment A1000-S and A1000-NS: 
Option A: 900 JPY to Role A and 1000 JPY to Role B 
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Option B: 1000 JPY to Role A and 900 JPY to Role B 
 
Role B will have to choose either option A or option B. The only information Role B will have is 
information sent by you in a message. That is, Role B will not know the monetary payments 
associated with each choice. 
 
Message 
We now ask you to choose one of the following two possible messages which you will send to Role 
B: 
 
Message 1: “Option A will earn you more money than option B.” 
Message 2: “Option B will earn you more money than option A.” 
 
How to send a message to Role B 
In the “Message” envelope you are provided with two cards. On one is written Message 1, and 
Message 2 is written on the other. You will choose one of the two messages and then enclose that 
card in the “Message” envelope. You will put the card you do not choose on the desk. After all Role 
A participants finish doing this, the experimenters will collect the “Message” envelope and provide 
the selected message to Role B in each pair. 
[In the “Message” envelope you are provided with two cards. On one is written Message A, and 
Message B is written on the other. You provide this “Message” envelope to Role B directly. First, you 
go out carrying two messages in the “Message” envelope when the experimenters signal. Role B 
goes out simultaneously. Next, you will choose one of the two messages and enclose the card on 
which it is written in the “Message” envelope at the table with partitions. You lay the card which you 
do not choose face down. If you want to check the instructions, please read the instructions affixed to 
the partitions. Last, you provide the “Message” envelope to Role B with whom you stand face to face. 
After you do this, please go back to your seat. Please do not speak to Role B during this time.] 
 
Earnings 
Role B chooses one of two alternatives, Option A or B, after Role B receives the message from Role 
A. The monetary payments for Roles A and B depend on this choice. The earnings are calculated by 
summing the monetary payment in the experiment and the show-up fee (500 JPY). You will be paid  
privately and in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
To repeat, you can know the monetary payments for both yourself and Role B. However, Role B will 
never know what sums were actually offered in the option not chosen (that is, he or she will never 
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know whether your message was true or not). Moreover, Role B will never know the sums to be paid 
to you according to the different options. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand quietly. The experimenters will answer them 
privately. 
 
A.2. Instructions for Role B as a receiver 
 
There are instructions and two kinds of messages, A and B, in the “Message” envelope. First, please 
check the envelope for these. Next, we will explain the procedure in depth. 
 
Overview 
In the experiment, one person in this room and one person in another room will interact with each 
other. Both of them are randomly assigned to one of two possible roles: either Role A or Role B. 
First, Role A will send a message to Role B. Next, Role B will choose a monetary payment option 
after Role B has received the message from Role A. The monetary payments for both Roles A and B 
in the experiment depend on the choice of Role B. 
Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk or in any way try to communicate with 
other participants during the experiment. The earnings are calculated by summing the monetary 
payment in the experiment and the show-up fee (500 JPY). You will be paid privately and in cash at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
Your role 
Your role in this experiment is Role B. Role A, with whom you will be paired in the experiment, is in 
another room. You will choose one of two alternatives, Option A or B. [Eliminating the following 
sentence: No information about your partner will be provided to you during or after the experiment.] 
At the end of the experiment, you will not meet Role A. 
 
Alternatives 
Two possible monetary payments are available to Role A and Role B in the experiment. Role B will 
have to choose either Option A or Option B. The only information Role B will have is information 
sent by Role A in a message. That is, Role B will not know the monetary payments associated with 
each choice. 
 
Message 
We now ask you, Role A, to choose one of the following two possible messages, which you will 
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send to Role B: 
 
Message 1: “Option A will earn you more money than option B.” 
Message 2: “Option B will earn you more money than option A.” 
 
One of the two messages, either Message 1 or Message 2, in the “Message” envelope from Role A is 
provided by the experimenter.  
[One of the two messages, either Message 1 or Message 2 in the “Message” envelope from Role A is 
provided by the experimenter. First, you go out when the experimenters signal. Role A goes out 
simultaneously. Next, you will receive the “Message” envelope from Role A after Role A chooses one 
of the two messages, 1 or 2, and then encloses the card on which it is written in the “Message” 
envelope at the table with partitions. After you do this, please go back to your seat. Please do not 
speak to Role A during this time.] 
 
How to send an alternative to Role A 
You will choose one of the two alternatives, Option A or B, after you receive the message. You are 
provided cards on which are written two alternatives, Options 1 and 2, in the “Decision” envelope. 
You will choose one of the two alternatives and then enclose that card in the “Decision” envelope. 
You will put the card you do not choose on the desk. After all Role B participants finish doing this, 
the experimenters will collect the “Decision” envelope and provide the selected alternative to Role A 
in each pair. 
 
Earnings 
You choose one of two alternatives, Option A or B, after you receive the message from Role A. The 
monetary payments for Roles A and B depend on this choice. The earnings are calculated by 
summing the monetary payment in the experiment and the show-up fee (500 JPY). You will be paid  
privately and in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
To repeat, Role A will know the monetary payments for both you and Role A when Role A chooses a 
message. However, you will never know what sums were actually offered in the option not chosen 
(that is, you will never know whether the message from Role A was true or not during and after the 
experiment). Moreover, you will never know the sums to be paid to you according to the different 
options. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand quietly. The experimenters will answer them 
privately. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaires 
 
B.1. Questionnaire for Role A as a sender 
 
B.1.1. First questionnaire [in face-to-face treatment] 
 
Please respond to the following. 
 
[1. About Role B in the pair:  
A: I have never seen him/her before. 
B: I have seen but never talked to him/ her. 
C: I just exchange greetings with him/her.  
D: I talk with him/ her sometimes.  
E: I often talk with him/her; he/she is a good friend of mine.  
 
2. How do you feel about Role B? 
A: Very good 
B: Good 
C: Neither good nor bad 
D: Not very good  
E: Not good at all] 
 
3. Do you expect Role B to believe your message is true? 
A: Role B will always believe it is true.  
B: Role B will sometimes believe it is true.  
C: Don’t know 
D: Role B will sometimes not believe it is true.  
E: Role B will never believe it is true.  
 
4. Which option do you expect Role B to choose? 
A: Option A 
B: Option B 
 
B.1.2. Second questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions. 
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 1. Did you send a message to Role B? 
A: Yes→ To question 2 
B: No→ To question 3 
 
2. (For individuals who chose answer A in question 1) What kind of message did you send? 
i) I told a lie. I am sorry. 
ii) I told a lie because there was a reason. 
iii) I told the truth. 
iv) I told the truth. Please believe me. 
Reason: 
 
3. (For individuals who chose answer B in question 1 ) Why did you not send a message?  
Reason: 
 
B.2. Questionnaire for Role B as a receiver 
 
B.2.1. First questionnaire [in face-to-face treatment] 
 
Please respond to the following. 
 
[1. About Role A in the pair:  
A: I have never seen him/her before.  
B: I have seen but never talked to him/ her. 
C: I just exchange greetings with him/her.  
D: I talk with him/ her sometimes.  
E: I often talk with him/her, he/she is a good friend of mine.  
 
2. How do you feel about Role A? 
A: Very good 
B: Good 
C: Neither good nor bad 
D: Not very good 
E: Not good at all] 
 
3. Do you believe the message from Role A to be true? 
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A: I absolutely believe it to be true.  
B: I sometimes believe it to be true.  
C: Don’t know 
D: I sometimes do not believe it to be true.  
E: I never believe it to be true.  
 
B.2.2. Second questionnaire 
 
Please check the message in the “Message 2” envelope and answer the following questions: 
 
1. What kind of message did you receive?  
The message: 
 
2. Do you believe the message from Role A to be true? 
A: I absolutely believe it to be true.  
B: I sometimes believe it to be true.  
C: Don’t know 
D: I sometimes do not believe it to be true.  
E: I never believe it to be true.  
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Appendix C: Second message instructions for Role A 
 
There are instructions, the alternative from Role B, and four kinds of other messages, i, ii, iii and iv, 
in the envelope. 
First, please check the envelope for these.  
Next, we will explain the messages in depth. It is possible for you to send or not send a message to 
Role B. When one sends a message, it is chosen from among the following four messages written on 
cards:  
 
i) I told a lie. I am sorry. 
ii) I told a lie because there were reasons. 
iii) I told the truth. 
iv) I told the truth. Please trust me. 
 
Last, one who wants to send a message encloses it in the “Message 2” envelope and all other 
messages are put in the first envelope that was used. One who does not send a message encloses all 
the messages in the first envelope. Then, the experimenters will collect them and send the “Message 
2” envelope to Role B in each pair. 
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Appendix D: Socioeconomic characteristics 
Variables Definition A1000-S A1000-NS A100-S A100-NS F1000
Gender 
A dummy variable=1 if a 
participant is female. 
0.432 
(0.042)
0.852 
(0.049) 
0.377 
(0.056)
0.694 
(0.059) 
0.444 
(0.042)
Age Age in years. 
20.714 
(0.222)
47.741 
(1.822) 
20.83 
(0.295)
47.270 
(1.635) 
20.183
(0.159)
Occupation 
A categorical variables: 1= 
full-time job; 2= part-time 
job; 3=self-employed; 4= 
housewife; 5=student. 
5.000 
(0.000)
3.481 
(0.188) 
5.000 
(0.000)
3.302 
(0.193) 
5.000 
(0.000)
Education 
A categorical variable: 
1=High school; 2=College; 
3=University; 4=Graduate 
school; 5=Other. 
- 
2.815 
(0.099) 
- 
2.460 
(0.117) 
- 
Household 
A categorical variable: 1=1 
person; 2=2 persons; 3=3 
persons; 4=4 persons; 5= 
above 5 persons. 
2.121 
(0.126)
3.019 
(0.148) 
2.195 
(0.164)
3.333 
(0.138) 
2.359 
(0.137)
Income a 
A categorical variable 
(JPY) : 1=under 2,500,000; 
2=2,500,000-3,999,999; 
3=4,000,000-5,499,999; 
4=5,500,000-6,999,999; 
5=above 7,000,000. 
2.679 
(0.175)
3.852 
(0.199) 
3.224 
(0.244)
3.730 
(0.196) 
3.218 
(0.182)
       
Observations  140 54 77 63 142 
Note: Numbers not in parentheses are mean values. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Note that this variable in the experiment denotes monthly disposable income besides room rental 
expenses.  
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Appendix E: Descriptive statistics both senders and receivers 
Sender Receiver A1000-S A1000-NS A100-S A100-NS F1000 Total 
Message 1 Option A 22 20 18 17 30 107 
(True) Option B 14 0 7 5 14 40 
        
Message 2 Option A 11 1 3 5 7 27 
(Lie) Option B 23 6 10 5 20 64 
        
Observation  70 27 38 32 71 238 
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Figure 1. Percentage of senders who told the lie in each treatment 
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Figure 2. The number of second messages in which a sender lied in each treatment 
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Notes: “No message” means that the sender does not send any message after the alternative chosen 
by the receiver is provided. Not sending a second message is based on the following reasons: I do 
not need to send a second message, I do not apologize for lying, and I did not lie repeatedly. Second 
Messages i) and ii) are sent to either apologize for lying or to excuse lying. Second Messages iii) and 
iv) are sent to make receivers believe the message is true or to lie to cover up another lie. Data for 
other reasons provide that are not choices in the second questionnaire are excluded here. 
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Table 1. Treatments and payoffs (in JPY) in treatments 
 
Treatment Anonymity Face-to-face 
Student  A100-S A1000-S F1000 
Non-student A100-NS A1000-NS - 
Notes: the payoff is derailed as follows: 
 
Payoff Option Sender Receiver 
A 900 1000 
100 
B 1000 900 
A 500 1500 
1000 
B 1500 500 
 
Table 2. The percentage of gender different of liars between treatments 
Sender A1000-S A1000-NS A100-S A100-NS F1000 Total 
Male 26.6 
(21/79) 
25.0 
(2/8) 
16.7 
(8/48) 
15.8 
(3/19) 
17.7 
(14/79) 
20.6 
(48/233)
Female  21.7 
(13/60) 
10.9 
(5/46) 
17.2 
(5/29) 
16.2 
(7/43) 
20.6 
(13/63) 
17.8 
(43/241)
       
Each treatment (p-value) 0.554 0.275 1.000 1.000 0.673  
Between treatments (p-value) 0.209 0.214 0.603 a  
No. liars 34 7 13 10 27 91 
Notes: a shows the statistical result between A1000-S and F1000 treatments. 
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Table 3. Logit regression results on lying behavior of senders  
Variables Definition Pooled a A1000-S  A100 b F1000 
Constant  -1.626**
(0.807) 
-0.952 
(0.738) 
-17.183*** 
(5.538) 
-2.805***
(0.954) 
Payoff The earnings. 0.002***
(0.000) c
0.001** 
(0.001) c 
0.017*** 
(0.006) c 
0.002***
(0.001) 
Expectation Dummy variable=1 if a sender expects that 
a receiver believes the message trust.  
-0.024 
(0.304) 
-0.169 
(0.520) 
0.062 
(0.564) 
0.309 
(0.577) 
Gender Dummy variable=1 if a sender is female. -0.060 
(0.314) 
-0.458 
(0.519) 
0.090 
(0.654) 
0.436 
(0.565) 
Student Dummy variable=1 if a sender is a student. -0.000 
(0.537) 
- 
-0.121 
(0.652) 
- 
Treatment d: 
A100 
Dummy variable=1 if a treatment is A100. -0.499 
(0.430) 
- - - 
Treatment d: 
F1000 
Dummy variable=1 if a treatment is 
F1000. 
-0.413 
(0.367) 
- - - 
Agreeable 
impression 
Dummy variable=1 if a sender have an 
agreeable impression for a receiver. 
- - - 
-0.102 
(0.578) 
Partner gender Dummy variable=1 if a receiver differ 
from gender to a sender. 
- - - 
0.008 
(0.574) 
      
Log-likelihood  -130.292 -45.143 -39.145 -40.558 
McFadden’s R2  0.081 0.069 0.117 0.140 
Observation  211 70 70 71 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote that the parameters are different 
from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. a is excluded data in A1000-NS  
because of statistical results.  b is pooled data both A100-S and A100-NS because of statistical 
results between treatments. c is significantly the largest marginal effect. d shows that the baseline 
treatment is A1000-S. 
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Table 4. Logit regression results on behavior of receivers who are practiced deception 
Variables Definition A1000-S F1000 
Constant -2.162*** 
(0.570) 
-0.548 
(0.592) 
Believe Dummy variable=1 if a receiver believes the 
message to be trust.  
1.616*** 
(0.602) a  
-0.039 
(0.560)  
Gender Dummy variable=1 if a receiver is female. 0.938 
(0.566) 
- 
Agreeable 
impression 
Dummy variable=1 if a receiver have an 
agreeable impression for a sender by seeing.
- 
-0.991* 
(0.567) a 
Gender in pair Dummy variable=1 if gender in pair is 
different.. 
- 
0.583 
(0.564)  
   
Log-likelihood -37.049 -40.365 
McFadden’s R2 0.142 0.044 
Observation 69 71 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote that the parameters are different 
from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. a is significantly the largest marginal 
effect.  
 
 
 
